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HOW JURORS DEAL WITH EXPERT
TESTIMONY AND HOW JUDGES CAN HELP*
Shari Seidman Diamond**
INTRODUCTION
Expert evidence is a familiar but challenging feature in the
modern trial.1 Judges must decide on the admissibility of expert
testimony,2 and jurors must grapple with the testimony if it is
admitted. If courts are uneasy about the ability of the jury to
handle the expert evidence, they may be inclined to play a more
active role as gatekeeper in monitoring what the jury will be
permitted to consider. Critics of the jury often assume that lay
jurors are incapable of understanding and assessing the claims of
* This article is based on my presentation at the Science for Judges IX
conference at the Brooklyn Law School in April, 2007. I drew on research
supported, in part, by research grants from the State Justice Institute (Grant SJI97-N-247), the National Science Foundation (Grant SBR9818806), and the
American Bar Foundation, with additional support from Northwestern University
Law School and Duke University Law School. For previously published work
based on this research, see infra at notes 6, 11, 23, 27 and 29. Thanks to my
collaborators, Mary R. Rose and Beth Murphy, for their comments on an earlier
version of the draft. Thanks also to Professor Margaret Berger, Suzanne J. &
Norman Miles Professor of Law at Brooklyn Law School and monitor of the
Symposium, whose leadership at the interface of science and law has inspired
and informed all of us.
** Howard J. Trienens Professor of Law and Professor of Psychology,
Northwestern University Law School and Senior Research Fellow, American
Bar Foundation.
1
See Samuel R. Gross, Expert Evidence, 1991 W IS. L. REV . 1113, 1114
(1991).
2
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993); see also
FED . R. EVID . 702–703; Kumho Tire Co. Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137
(1999); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997).

47

D IAMOND F INAL DRAFT A UTHOR IZED . DOC

48

12/3/07 5:15 PM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

experts who present technical, scientific, or pseudo-scientific
testimony.3 What may happen if jurors indeed cannot competently
evaluate expert testimony? One possibility is that they will ignore
crucial evidence. An alternative possibility is that the jurors will be
naively uncritical of expert testimony, overawed by an expert with
imposing credentials, impressed by jargon they do not understand,
and misled by “its aura of special reliability and trustworthiness.”4
Neither of these threats comports with the picture of jury reactions
to experts that emerges from empirical research on jury behavior.5
That is not to say that juries always understand expert
evidence. No layperson, juror, or judge faced with complex
technical or scientific evidence can be expected to master all of this
challenging material, so it is not surprising to find occasions on
which the trier of fact reaches a decision that appears to be
inconsistent with the weight of the evidence. Indeed, one of the
advantages of appellate review is that it can provide some check on
these errors. But before drawing any conclusions about deficiencies
in how jurors deal with expert testimony, a more systematic
analysis of the evidence is required. I begin with an overall picture
of jury decision-making drawn from a variety of empirical studies. I
then turn specifically to research addressing how jurors respond to
expert testimony. Finally, I consider the particular challenges
posed by experts and what judges can do to optimize how jurors
deal with expert testimony.
Throughout this analysis, I draw on several different
approaches to the empirical study of jury behavior. Together these
different ways of studying the jury provide a more grounded and
comprehensive picture of juries than would be obtainable from one
methodor from the selective newspaper coverage of unusual
trials.6 The methods include archival studies of jury verdicts;7 post3

See, e.g., PETER W. H UBER, GALILEO ’S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN

THE COURTROOM (1991).
4

United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 1973).
Neil Vidmar & Shari Seidman Diamond, Juries and Expert Evidence, 66
BROOK. L. R EV . 1121, 1149–67 (2001).
6
Shari Seidman Diamond, Truth, Justice, and the Jury, 26 HARV. J. OF
LAW & PUB . POL ’ Y 143 (2003); Michael McCann et al., Java Jive: Genealogy
of a Juridical Icon, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV . 113, 142 (2001); Laura Beth Nielsen
5
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trial surveys of jurors;8 surveys of jury observers, such as judges
and attorneys;9 simulations;10 and a unique study, the Arizona Jury
Project, in which we were able to videotape and analyze actual civil
jury deliberations.11
Each of these sources has strengths and weaknesses. Archival
studies can collect information on large samples of cases but
depend on the information that courts or jury verdict reporters
have collected. As a result, a significant amount of relevant
information is often missing. Post-trial surveys and interviews with
jurors enable researchers to reconstruct juror understandings and
deliberations with input from the jurors themselves, but even
cooperative jurors may provide incomplete and misleading
impressions. Jurors who are questioned after trial know how the
trial came out and have publicly endorsed the verdict. The outcome
can have a powerful impact on the jurors, leading them in
& Aaron Beim, Media Misrepresentation: Title VII, Print Media, and Public
Perceptions of Discrimination Litigation, 15 STAN . L. & POL ’ Y REV . 237
(2004); Daniel S. Bailis & Robert J. MacCoun, Estimating Liability Risks with
the Media as Your Guide: A Content Analysis of Media Coverage of Tort
Litigation, 20 LAW & H UM. B EHAV . 419 (1996).
7
Gross, supra note 1.
8
Sanja Kutnjak Ivkovic & Valerie P. Hans, Jurors’ Evaluations of Expert
Testimony: Judging the Messenger and the Message, 28 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY
441, 450–452 (2003); Daniel W. Shuman & Anthony Champagne, Removing
the People from the Legal Process: The Rhetoric and Research on Judicial
Selection and Juries, 3 PSYCH . PUB . POL . & L. 242, 253–56 (1997).
9
HARRY KALVEN , JR., & HANS ZEISEL, T HE AMERICAN JURY (1966);
Larry Heuer & Steven Penrod, Trial Complexity: A Field Investigation of Its
Meaning and Its Effects, 18 LAW & HUM . BEHAV . 29 (1994); Theodore
Eisenberg et al., Judge-Jury Agreement in Criminal Cases: A Partial
Replication of Kalven and Zeisel’s The American Jury, 2 J. EMPIRICAL. LEGAL
STUDIES 171 (2005).
10
Margaret B. Kovera et al., Reasoning About Scientific Evidence: Effects
of Juror Gender and Evidence Quality on Juror Decisions in a Hostile Work
Environment Case, 84 J. APP. PSYCHOL . 362 (1999); Brian L. Cutler et al.,
Expert Testimony and Jury Decision Making: An Empirical Analysis, 7 BEHAV .
SCI . & L. 215 (1989).
11
Shari Seidman Diamond, Neil Vidmar, Mary R. Rose, Leslie Ellis, &
Beth Murphy, Juror Discussions During Civil Trials: Studying an Arizona
Innovation, 45 ARIZ. L. REV . 1 (2003) [hereinafter Juror Discussions During
Civil Trials].
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retrospect to view the ultimate verdict as inevitable and affecting
their recall of the process that produced the jury’s decision.12
In jury simulationsthe method most frequently used to study
jury behaviorit is possible to systematically test the impact of
variations in evidence or procedure on jurors, thereby providing
strong causal evidence on how these variations affect behavior.
Mock jurors participating in simulations, however, even those
simulations using members of the jury venire and presenting fulllength videotaped trials, know that they are in a simulation. In
addition, both the trials and the jury deliberations in simulations are
predictably short in duration.13 The extent to which these
characteristics affect the behavior of mock jurors is likely to vary,
depending on the nature of the case and the behavior being
measured.
Finally, one study of deliberating juries deciding actual cases
provides for the first time a direct window into real jury
deliberations, even though it too has a potential weakness: although
the jurors were assured that, under court order, no one other than
the researchers would ever view the deliberations, and the cameras
were unobtrusively positioned in the ceilings, the jurors knew that
their deliberations were being videotaped.14 While each of these
methods thus has both strengths and weaknesses, the weaknesses
vary across methods. Together, this large body of research shows a
consistent pattern of results, both in describing jury behavior
overall and in revealing how jurors react to experts.15

12

See Baruch Fischhoff, Hindsight ≠ Foresight: The Effect of Outcome
Knowledge on Judgment Under Uncertainty, 1 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCH. 288,
288 (1975).
13
For a discussion of the value and limitations of jury simulations, see
Shari Seidman Diamond, Illuminations and Shadows From Jury Simulations,
21 LAW & H UM. B EHAV . 561, 562 (1997).
14
For a detailed description of the taping and consent procedures, see Juror
Discussions During Civil Trials, supra note 11, at 23.
15
See Vidmar & Diamond, supra note 5, at 1174.
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T HE J URY’S A P PROACH TO THE TRIAL

A jury is not a blank slate that merely absorbs trial evidence
and instructions on the law before applying the law to the evidence
in order to arrive at a verdict. Indeed, courts recognize that
something more is afoot when they tell jurors to consider all of the
evidence in the light of reason, common sense, and experience.
Jurors consider all of the evidence in this manneras they
mustwhen arriving at their decisions. All human decisionmakers
(judges as well as jurors) find it necessary to draw on their prior
experiences to make sense of what they see and hear. Those prior
beliefs and expectations unavoidably filter and organize
perceptions,16 often assisting and occasionally impairing reasonable
inferences about the evidence. For example, a juror in one of the
cases in the Arizona Jury Project submitted a question during trial
asking whether the fact that a young man had been drinking prior to
being injured in a serious accident was likely to have affected the
severity of his injury.17 This juror was implicitly drawing on his
beliefs about the effects of alcohol, and perhaps his prior
experiences with drinking.18 The ubiquitous impact of prior
experience on judgment was reflected in an insightful observation
from United States Supreme Court Justice John Paul Stevens in a
recent interview.19 Justice Stevens said that he was sure that his
views on the Supreme Court had been influenced by the “totally
unjust conviction” of his father for embezzlement.20
16

Charles G. Lord, Lee Ross, & Mark R. Lepper. Biased Assimilation and
Attitude Polarization: The Effects of Prior Theories on Subsequently
Considered Evidence, 37 J. P ERS. & S OC. PSYCH . 2098 (1979).
17
The Project is described in Juror Discussions During Civil Trials,
supra note 11, and discussed further infra text accompanying notes 28–33.
18
In Arizona, where jurors are permitted to submit questions for witnesses
during trial, a juror posed this question for the defense expert. The expert
responded that the plaintiff’s drinking would have had no effect. It was a
particularly credible response because a different answer might have assisted the
defense. The issue was never mentioned during deliberations.
19
Jeffrey Rosen, The Dissenter, N.Y. T IMES MAGAZINE, Sept. 23, 2007, at
50, 54.
20
Id.
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Research on jurors indicates that they typically are strongly
motivated to reach a correct verdict, and that they actively process
what they see and hear in the courtroom to arrive at that decision.21
Jurors apply commonsense norms of behavior to evaluate the
reasonableness of behavior and to sort out competing claims.22
They are also aware that they are in an adversary setting, that all of
the witnesses and attorneys are attempting to persuade them, and
that it will be up to the jurors to decide which of the conflicting
accounts is convincing. As a result, jurors are alert to signs that
witnesses are dissembling, and they “cross-check” claims, seeking
consistency across sources.23 Jurors are particularly interested in
evidence that appears to be less subject to manipulation and more
reliable than the claims of an interested party or other witness. As
the jurors watch the trial unfold, they also realize that at the trial’s
conclusion they will have to reach a group decision which may
involve convincing fellow jurors who have different reactions to the
evidence. Although individuals tend to expect others to see the
world the way they see it,24 the anticipation of having to defend
one’s views and persuade others tends to promote active
21

See generally W. LANCE BENNETT & MARTHA S. FELDMAN ,
RECONSTRUCTING REALITY IN THE COURTROOM (1981); Nancy Pennington &
Reid Hastie, A Cognitive Theory of Juror Decision Making: The Story Model,
13 CARDOZO L. REV . 519 (1991); Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie,
Explaining the Evidence: Tests of the Story Model for Juror Decision Making,
62 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL . 189 (1992); Shari Seidman Diamond &
Jonathan D. Casper, Blindfolding the Jury to Verdict Consequences: Damages,
Experts, and the Civil Jury, 26 LAW & SOC’ Y REV . 513 (1992).
22
NORMAN F INKEL , COMMONSENSE JUSTICE: JUROR’S NOTIONS OF THE
LAW (1995); see also Jason Schklar & Shari Seidman Diamond, Juror
Reactions to DNA Evidence: Errors and Expectancies, 23 LAW & HUM .
BEHAV . 159, 180–81 (1999).
23
Shari Seidman Diamond, Mary R. Rose, Beth Murphy & Sven Smith,
Juror Questions During Trial: A Window Into Juror Thinking, 59
VANDERBILT L. REV . 1927, 1954–62 (2006) [hereinafter Juror Questions
During Trial].
24
Lee Ross, David Greene, & Pamela House, The “False Consensus
Effect”: An Egocentric Bias in Social Perception and Attribution Processes, 13
J. EXPER. SOC. PSYCHOL. 279 (1977); Joachim Krueger & Russell W.
Clement, The Truly False Consensus Effect: An Ineradicable and Egocentric
Bias in Social Perception, 67 J. P ERS. SOC . PSYCH. 596 (1994).
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engagement and processing.25
This engagement by jurors does not eliminate their need to
struggle with some of the judgments they are asked to make and the
tools (e.g., jury instructions) they are expected to use in reaching
those judgments. Jury interactions during deliberations generally do
not represent a linear decision-making process, yet by the end of
deliberations, this group process generally results in a verdict that
most jurors see as fairly reflecting the facts that led to the trial and
comporting with the law as they understand it.
II. J UROR RESPONSE TO EXPERTS
Complex evidence presents a particular challenge for both the
experts who must communicate with a lay audience and the
audience members themselvesthe triers of fact. Jurors recognize
the value of expert evidence for assisting them in reaching their
decisions, but surveys of jurors indicate that while jurors find
expert testimony to be useful, they are also wary of experts. For
example, in one survey of jurors, 30 percent said, “experts
provided biased testimony.”26 Other studies have shown that
jurors expect experts to be relatively competent and likely to be
knowledgeable, but jurors also anticipate that the experts will be
influenced by the side that called them to testify. 27 Thus,
countervailing forces influence juror perceptions of expert
testimony because the credibility of a communicator is influenced
by the communicator’s expertise and trustworthiness. The
expectation of potential bias acts as a brake on the persuasiveness
of an expert.28
25

Philip E. Tetlock, Accountability: A Social Check on the Fundamental
Attribution Error, 48 SOC. PSYCHOL . Q. 227, 233 (1985).
26
Daniel W. Shuman, Elizabeth Whitaker & Anthony Champagne, An
Empirical Examination of the Use of Expert Witnesses in the Courts—Part II:
A Three City Study, 34 JURIMETRICS J. 193, 203 (1994).
27
Shari Seidman Diamond, Beyond Fantasy and Nightmare: A Portrait of
the Jury, 54 B UFF. L. R EV . 717, 746 (2006).
28
See Shari Seidman Diamond & Jonathan D. Casper, Blindfolding the
Jury to Verdict Consequences: Damages, Experts, and the Civil Jury, 26 LAW
& SOC’ Y REV . 513, 558 (1992).
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The Arizona Jury Project, in which we observed actual jury
deliberations, presented a unique opportunity to observe how
juries handle expert testimony. 29 The opportunity to study these
jury deliberations arose because an innovative group of judges and
attorneys in Arizona, encouraged by the Arizona Supreme Court,
took a close look at their jury system. As a result, Arizona decided
to make some changes aimed at facilitating jury performance,
including a controversial innovation instructing jurors that they
were permitted to discuss the case among themselves during breaks
in the trial. To evaluate the effect of allowing discussions, the
Arizona Supreme Court issued an order permitting a team of
researchers to conduct a randomized experiment in which some
jurors in some cases were instructed that they could discuss the
case and others were given the traditional admonition not to discuss
the case.30 The court order also permitted us to videotape the jury
discussions and deliberations.31
The jurors, attorneys, and parties were promised that the tapes
would be viewed only by the researchers and only for research
purposes. Jurors were told about the videotaping project when
they arrived at court for their jury service. If they preferred not to
participate, they were assigned to cases not involved in the project.
29

See Juror Discussions During Civil Trials, supra, note 11. Other
published articles drawing on data from the Arizona Project include: Shari
Seidman Diamond & Neil Vidmar, Jury Room Ruminations on Forbidden
Topics, 87 VA . L. REV . 1857 (2001); Shari Seidman Diamond, Neil Vidmar,
Mary Rose, Leslie Ellis, & Beth Murphy, Inside the Jury Room: Evaluating
Juror Discussions During Trial, 87 JUDICATURE 54 (2003); Diamond, supra
note 6; Shari Seidman Diamond, Mary R. Rose, & Beth Murphy, Jurors’
Unanswered Questions, 41 CT . REV . 20 (2004); Shari Seidman Diamond,
Mary R. Rose & Beth Murphy, Revising the Unanimity Requirement: The
Behavior of the Non-Unanimous Civil Jury, 100 NW . U. L. REV . 201 (2006);
Juror Questions During Trial, supra note 23.
30
See Juror Discussions During Civil Trials, supra note 11.
31
See id. at 17, for a detailed report on the permissions and security
measures the project required, and the results of the evaluation. As part of their
obligations of confidentiality under the Supreme Court Order as well as
additional assurances to parties and jurors undertaken by the principal
investigators, the Authors of this Article have changed certain details to disguise
individual cases. The changes do not, however, affect the substantive nature of
the findings that are reported.
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The juror participation rate was over 95 percent.32 Attorneys and
litigants were less willing to take part in the study. Some attorneys
were generally willing to participate when they had a case before
one of the participating judges; others consistently refused. The
result was a 22 percent yield among otherwise eligible trials.
We also videotaped the trials themselves and collected the
exhibits, juror questions submitted during trial, jury instructions,
and verdict forms. In addition, the jurors, attorneys, and judge
completed questionnaires at the end of the trial. The fifty cases in
the study reflected the usual mix of cases dealt with by state
courts: 26 motor vehicle cases (52 percent), four medical
malpractice cases (8 percent), seventeen other tort cases (34
percent), and three contract cases (6 percent).33 Awards ranged
from $1,000 to $2.8 million, with a median award of $25,500.
In the prior analysis of the discussion innovation, we looked
for indicators of how the opportunity for discussion affected
jurors’ response to expert testimony. The opportunity to discuss
the case appeared to be particularly helpful in the more complex
cases. When factual questions arose about the evidence, discussion
tended to improve the accuracy of recall. Moreover, jurors
permitted to discuss the case reported significantly greater ease in
comprehension of the expert testimony. 34 Thus, the opportunity
to discuss the case appeared to provide assistance precisely where
advocates of the innovation expected it would be most valuable.
After completing our evaluation of the impact of the
discussions innovation on the Arizona juries, we turned to analyses
of the deliberations from this unique data set to answer other
questions about the jury. Some of these analyses provide insights
32

Although we cannot be certain that the cameras had no effect on their
behavior during deliberations, the behavior during deliberations at times
included comments that the jurors presumably would not have wanted the
judges or attorneys to hear.
33
This distribution is similar to the breakdown for civil jury trials for the
Pima Country Superior Court for the year 2001: 62 percent motor vehicle tort
cases, 8 percent medical malpractice cases, 23 percent other tort cases and 6
percent contract cases (figures provided by Nicole M. Waters of the National
Center for State Courts).
34
Juror Discussions During Civil Trials, supra note 11, at 74–76.
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into how jurors respond to expert testimony. Forty-three of the
fifty cases had experts who gave live testimony, a median of three
per case. Half of the cases (24 of the 50) had opposing experts who
testified on the same issue. The 122 live expert witnesses included
physicians, mental health professionals, biomechanical engineers,
financial analysts, and academic scientists. The jurors in these cases
had an opportunity to submit questions for these experts during
trial. In Arizona, as in a small but growing number of jurisdictions,
jurors are permitted to submit questions for witnesses during
trial.35 The 257 questions the jurors submitted for experts revealed
what jurors were thinking about as they were being exposed to
expert testimony,36 and their deliberations provide some insights
into juror reactions to the experts.
Research on cognitive processing distinguishes between two
reactions to attempts at persuasion.37 The first is peripheral or
heuristic processing which occurs when decision makers are either
unmotivated or unable to evaluate the arguments that a
communicator is making. Under those circumstances, the decision
maker is inclined to use a short cuta heuristicto decide whether
or not to accept the claims being made. The prestige of the
communicator, e.g., her occupation or education, provides a
peripheral cue to the decision maker that, all other things being
equal, he should accept the claims that the expert is making. If
jurors were motivated to avoid the effort of evaluating expert
evidence, or if they simply were unable to process the information
35

A few states, including Arizona, now require judges to tell jurors that
they may submit questions during trial. Most leave the choice to judicial
discretion, although a few explicitly forbid it. The 2005 ABA Principles for
Juries and Jury Trials endorses the practice. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION ,
PRINCIPLES FOR JURIES AND JURY TRIALS, PRINCIPLE 13(C).
36
This section is based in part on Juror Questions During Trial, supra
note 23, focusing on the 257 questions jurors submitted for experts out of the
829 total questions they submitted for all witnesses.
37
ALICE H. EAGLY & SHELLY CHAIKEN , T HE PSYCHOLOGY OF
ATTITUDES 326–27 (1993); Shelly Chaiken, The Heuristic Model of
Persuasion, in 5 SOCIAL INFLUENCE: T HE O NTARIO SYMPOSIUM 3 (Mark P.
Zanna et al. eds., 1987); R ICHARD E. PETTY , COMMUNICATION AND
PERSUASION: CENTRAL AND PERIPHERAL ROUTES TO ATTITUDE CHANGE 3
(John T. Cacioppo ed., 1986).
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an expert was offering, they could simply defer and accept the
conclusions without engaging in further processing. Jurors would
be engaged in peripheral processing if they merely compared the
credentials of two opposing experts and accepted the opinions of
the more prestigious source.
A second form of processing, called central or systematic
processing, occurs when a decision maker is motivated to
understand and evaluate a persuasive communication, scrutinizing
the quality of the arguments and not simply deferring to the claims
of a prestigious source.38 The questions jurors submitted to the
experts reveal how jurors attempted to deal with expert testimony
as it was being presented during trial.
The clearest evidence of peripheral processing would emerge if
jurors failed to submit questions to the expert witnesses at all or if
they asked only about credentials or experience. In fact, jurors
submitted questions for almost half (47.5 percent) of the expert
witnesses, averaging 2.11 questions per witness. Even though
jurors are instructed that they should consider the qualifications
and experience of expert witnesses in judging their credibility, 39
only fifteen (5.8 percent) of the 257 questions directed to the
experts concerned credentials or experience. Instead, the nature of
the questions generally reflected attempts by the jurors to get
further information that could assist them in evaluating the content
of the testimony. Many of the questions focused on alternative
38

Chaiken, supra note 37, at 3; see generally Ronald J. Allen & Joseph S.
Miller, The Common Law Theory of Experts: Deference or Education?, 87 N W .
U. L. REV . 1131 (1993).
39
ARIZONA STATE BAR, REVISED ARIZONA JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CIVIL) 6,
7 (3d ed. 1997)
A witness qualified as an expert by education or experience may state
opinions on matters in that witness’s field of expertise, and may also
state reasons for those opinions. Expert opinion testimony should be
judged just as any other testimony. You are not bound by it. You may
accept it or reject it, in whole or in part, and you should give it as
much weight as you think it deserves, considering the witness’s
qualifications and experience, the reasons given for the opinions, and all
the other evidence in the case.
Id.
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possible causes for the plaintiff’s injury.
Although overall, issues of causation were the focus of 21.1
percent of the juror questions, they accounted for 34.6 percent of
the questions for experts. For example, in a medical malpractice
case a juror asked: “What were other potential causes for the . . .
damage that you observed and why were they less plausible causes
for [the plaintiff’s injury] than the cause that you have
ascertained?” Other questions simply sought clarification on what
the witness had said. For example, in one case involving a claim of
infliction of emotional distress, a juror asked the psychologist,
“What does the term ‘reasonable psychological probability’
mean?” In some of the questions, jurors probed the basis for the
expert’s conclusions. In a motor vehicle case, a juror asked the
engineer who testified about his description of what must have
happened to the passenger at the time of impact, “Not knowing
how he was sitting, or his weight, how can you be sure he hit his
shoulder?” In a products liability case, the jurors questioned a
scientist on his methods for testing and evaluating the product.
And in several cases, experts testified about standards of
reasonable care and jurors submitted questions asking whether
specific governmental or industry regulations applied and, if so,
what the codes or regulations said. In sum, the questions as a group
reflect a picture consistent with central rather than peripheral
processing. In some cases, the expert testimony did not turn out to
be pertinent for the jurors in reaching their verdicts (e.g., when a
physician testified about the extent of a plaintiff’s injury and the
jury concluded that the defendant had not been negligent), but in
other cases the jurors discussed the content of the expert testimony
extensively during deliberations.
Examples from the deliberations reveal some of the cues jurors
used to evaluate the trustworthiness of the expert testimony. 40
Jurors were suspicious of experts who appeared to be obfuscating.
As one juror complained, “He won’t give you a straight answer.”
They also occasionally expressed concern that an expert’s opinion
was unrepresentative. For example, in a medical malpractice case in
40

We will present a comprehensive analysis of the role played by expert
testimony in these deliberations in a future article.
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which opposing experts made opposing claims about the
reasonable standard of care, a juror expressed concern about the
difficulty of evaluating which was more accurate: “What I would
like to have is 40 [specialists] and show them the [test results] and
okay, get a survey and is this significant or is this not significant
and would they have [done what the defendant did]?”
We asked the judges to indicate on their post-trial
questionnaires the names of any witnesses who were “particularly
important or crucial” on the issue of liability for the plaintiff’s case
and for the defendant’s case. In five of the cases the judges named
two expert witnesses in the same general field (e.g., medicine,
engineering) who gave opposing testimony on the same liability
issue. In these five cases, the evidence presented by the experts
was clearly contested and, in the judge’s opinion, central to the
case. I examined the trial evidence and jury deliberations in these
cases to get an overall picture of the extent to which the juries dealt
with the testimony given by these experts, and how they
attempted to resolve the differences between them. During their
deliberations, the jurors discussed the testimony of all of these
witnesses, although they did not discuss the testimony of each
expert in detail in each case:
Case 1: The principal dispute between the experts
concerned the need for surgery to relieve pain following an
accident. The medical issue was whether the surgery was
actually done in response to a preexisting injury or
degenerative condition. The defense claimed that the
accident had not caused any injury, and that surgery was
unwarranted. The jurors spent much of their time analyzing
the circumstances of the accident in light of the testimony
of lay witnesses who were on the scene, concluding that the
accident had caused some injury. Nonetheless, the jurors
were doubtful about the credibility of the plaintiff who
appeared to give inconsistent testimony about his injuries.
In discussing the competing medical testimony, the jurors
consulted the MRI results as well as the expert testimony
about the alleged injury. Several jurors expressed
disapproval in response to the defense attorney’s argument
that the plaintiff’s expert, a “doctor that teaches at a
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university,” was offering junk science and was not being
reputable. Nonetheless, the jurors were persuaded that the
plaintiff was exaggerating his pain, as the defense expert
suggested. The jurors concluded that the plaintiff would
have been better off “if [defense expert] had been his doctor
from the beginning.”
Case 2: In a medical malpractice case, the opposing experts
disagreed on whether the defendant met the relevant
standard of care, the diagnosis, and the causal impact of the
defendant’s behavior. Both experts were well-credentialed
and experienced. The jurors viewed both of them as good
teachers, although they found the defense expert somewhat
longwinded. They were also impressed by the experts’
credentials (“Have you seen the credentials on this doctor?
Have you read his resume? It’s the size of a small book.”)
But they viewed with some cynicism what they perceived
as the attempt to impress them with it (“That’s part of the
reason why they gave that to us to read.”). There were
many other witnesses in the case, but the jurors spent the
bulk of their time during deliberations discussing the
content of the testimony from these opposing experts,
comparing what they said on all three of the relevant
contested issues they covered. The jurors in the end were
persuaded that the outcome would probably have been
different if the defendant had treated the patient according
to what they were convinced was reasonable care.
Case 3: The plaintiffs in this case claimed they had suffered
emotional trauma due to a serious injury the defendant had
caused. The opposing experts offered testimony on the
evidence for the emotional distress and its probable cause.
The defense expert claimed that other conflict in the family
and prior events could explain the emotional trauma
allegedly experienced by one of the plaintiffs. The jurors
spent little time discussing the expert testimony, although
they discussed the likely causes of the plaintiff’s emotional
disturbance. Unlike the other expert testimony that
appeared technical or scientific on its face, the jurors did
not struggle to work through the meaning of the clinical
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testimony on mental health. They appeared comfortable in
drawing conclusions about the alleged trauma based on their
own experience. The jurors were also inclined to discount
the testimony of the plaintiff’s expert who they viewed as
arrogant. Although they also specifically rejected his
analysis of the extent of the plaintiff’s psychological injury
as overblown and only partially agreed with his causal
account of its source, they ultimately arrived at a modest
damage award on this claim.
Case 4: The plaintiff hired the defendant to repair her
furnace. The defendant repaired the furnace, but informed
the plaintiff that she needed to replace it due to its age. The
plaintiff adjusted some wiring next to the furnace after the
defendant completed the repair. When the furnace caught
fire a short time later, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant
was responsible. The opposing experts testified on the
likely cause of the fire, and much of the deliberation focused
on that testimony, as the jurors struggled to make sense of
the competing paths that might have led to the fire.
Ultimately, the jurors were not convinced that the
repairman had been careless or negligent, and they were
unpersuaded that the plaintiff had shown that the causal
mechanism the expert identified was the cause of the fire.
Several jurors concluded that the weight of the evidence was
evenly balanced, so the defendant should prevail.
Case 5: The opposing experts the judge identified as
important in this automobile collision were both engineers
who offered testimony on how the accident had occurred,
including its physical impact on the plaintiff. Liability for
minor injury to the plaintiff was not in dispute, but the
point of impact and liability for the major injury the
plaintiff claimed he had sustained, were hotly contested.
The plaintiff’s expert had more education (a Ph.D), while
the defense expert had more experience as a consultant in
accident reconstruction. The jurors explored this difference,
but ultimately concluded that it was not significant and
focused their attention on the content of the testimony.
Much of their discussion of these experts occurred during
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breaks in the trial.41 During the deliberations, the jury
focused on both the medical testimony and the impact
analyses. The jurors concluded that the defense medical
expert was correct when he testified that all, or at least part,
of the plaintiff’s medical condition had been caused by a
pre-existing injury, rather than by damage resulting from the
collision. The jury also discussed how the plaintiff’s failure
to wear his seatbelt had contributed to the injury.
Many of the themes reflected in the jurors’ questions for
experts and in these deliberations mirror patterns we have observed
in other research on juries: the jurors do not accept expert
testimony on face value. They consider credentials and expertise,
but are actively engaged with the content and attempt to assess the
accuracy of what the experts say. Although the jurors vary in their
understanding of the evidence, jurors who appear to have greater
mastery of the evidence assist the others and tend to be most
influential. Thus, juries draw on the expertise of their most
competent member to assess the strength of the evidence.42
Nonetheless, although jurors typically work diligently and
ordinarily succeed as a group in understanding the major elements
of the expert testimony, they are sometimes confused by what
experts say. 43 Jurors are instructed to base their verdicts on the
evidence and legal instructions, but their ability to fully process the
evidence may be reduced if the expert fails to teach as well as to
attempt to persuade. Even when this occurs, jurors generally are
not overwhelmed and misled by the complexity of expert evidence.
Instead, they use reasonable strategies to evaluate it44 When faced
41

The jury in this case was told that jury members were permitted to
discuss the evidence during breaks.
42
See Diamond & Casper, supra note 28.
43
MOLLY SELVIN & LARRY PICUS, T HE DEBATE OVER JURY
PERFORMANCE 27–28 (1987). See generally Joseph Sanders, Jury Deliberation
in a Complex Case: Havner v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 16 JUST. SYS. J. 45
(1993).
44
See Richard O. Lempert, Civil Juries and Complex Cases: Taking Stock
After Twelve Years, in VERDICT: ASSESSING THE C IVIL JURY SYSTEM 181
(Robert E. Litan ed., 1993); Irwin Horowitz & Kenneth S. Bordens, An
Experimental Investigation of Procedural Issues in Complex Tort Trials, 14
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with technical testimony, jurors look for cues about the
trustworthiness of the source, sometimes using the language itself
as a cue. They do use credentials and experience as cues, but not in
the absence of an evaluation of the message itself. That is, there is
little evidence to suggest that jurors adopt the position of an expert
based solely on peripheral cues.45 What is more likely to happen is
that the juror will reject unintelligible expert testimonya pattern
that should create an incentive for experts (and for the attorneys
who hire them) to maximize the clarity of the expert’s
presentation.
When jurors do understand the expert’s testimony, impressive
credentials and technical language may boost the influence of an
expert.46 When the expert’s lack of clarity prevents jurors from
understanding the testimony, the expert is less likely to
successfully persuade the jurors.47 This pattern is consistent with
the literature on persuasion which indicates that use of obscure and
unusual words generally reduces persuasiveness48 and with models
of attitude change that emphasize reception as a precondition to
yielding.49 Jurors may give less credence to an expert who uses
jargon if the jurors interpret it as obfuscation or if the expert
displays other evidence of potential bias such as an unusually high
rate of pay. 50
The jury has one advantage over judges when dealing with
expert evidence. Neither judge nor jury is likely to be an expert on
LAW & HUM . BEHAV . 269, 284 (1990); Vidmar & Diamond, supra note 5 at
1143.
45
See sources cited supra note 37 and accompanying text.
46
See Joel Cooper, Elizabeth A. Bennett, & Holly L. Sukel, Complex
Scientific Testimony: How Do Jurors Make Decisions?, 20 LAW & HUM .
BEHAV . 379, 382 (1996).
47
See Diamond & Casper, supra note 21, at 542, 543.
48
See generally John Waite Bowers, Language Intensity, Social
Introversion, and Attitude Change, 30 SPEECH MONOGRAPHS 345 (1963).
49
See William J. McGuire, Attitude Change: The Information Processing
Paradigm, in EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 108 (Charles Graham
McClintock ed., 1972).
50
See Joel Cooper & Isaac M. Neuhaus, The “Hired Gun” Effect:
Assessing the Effect of Pay, Frequency of Testifying, and Credentials on the
Perception of Expert Testimony, 24 LAW & H UM . BEHAV . 149, 150–51 (2000).
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the technical substantive content that an expert may offer, but the
jury is more likely to have at least one member who has a
substantive technical background or some training in science. How
jurors should use this quasi-expertise in the jury room is the
subject of some debate,51 but there is no doubt that jurors do draw
on their experience, whether such experience is technical, scientific,
or otherwise, when responding to the evidence at trial. Although
there is no evidence that complexity induces a greater rate of
disagreement between judges and juries on the appropriate
verdict, 52 complexity nonetheless presents a general and
unavoidable challenge to legal decision-making that is not unique to
jury trials.
III. WHAT J UDGES CAN D O
A judge who is motivated to optimize how juries handle expert
testimony has a number of tools available. As most studies of the
jury show, when jurors enter the courtroom, they are interested in
learning and eager to reach a correct decision. Judges can facilitate
the learning process. In 1993, Judge Michael Dann provided a
blueprint for how to optimize juror understanding when he offered
an education model that included innovations such as allowing juror
note-taking, permitting juror questions during trial, and instructing
the jury on the relevant law before the trial begins.53
Some courts have adopted these procedures, but the changes
have been slow and the old ways persist. 54 As we have learned
from the Arizona Jury Project, permitting jurors to submit
questions for witnesses reveals that the jurors have substantive
questions for the experts that can be answered promptly and can
51

See, e.g., People v. Maragh, 729 N.E.2d 701 (N.Y. 2000).
KALVEN & ZEISEL , supra note 9, at 56; see also Heuer & Penrod, supra
note 9, at 49; Eisenberg et al., supra note 9, at 171–72.
53
B. Michael Dann, “Learning Lessons” and “Speaking Rights”:
Creating Educated and Democratic Juries, 68 I ND. L.J. 1229, 1251–53 (1993).
54
For a summary of current patterns in federal and state courts, see National
Center for State Courts, The State-of-the-States Survey of Jury Improvement
Efforts Executive Summary, www.ncsconline.org/D_Research/cjs/pdf/sos_exec_
sum.pdf (last visited Nov. 30, 2007).
52
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dispel some sources of confusion when they arise.55 Other research
has shown that note-taking improves recall and understanding,56
and providing mock jurors with summaries of expert reports before
the experts testify can facilitate juror understanding of the
testimony.57 If the aim is an informed decision maker, whose
common sense judgments are not sabotaged by technical obstacles,
the judge and attorneys can provide trial notebooks with glossaries
and interim statements in order to offer further assistance in a
complex expert-laden trial.
Another promising potential tool that has not yet been the
subject of systematic study but is worth consideration is the
scheduling of back-to-back experts. To facilitate ease in comparing
the testimony of opposing experts who would otherwise testify
days or even weeks apart, it may be worth adjusting the typical
trial order to permit the experts to testify back-to-back. If this
innovation is introduced, the judge should explain how and why
this is being done (e.g., “to make it easier for you to understand the
parties’ evidence on these complex issues”). The advantage of the
judge’s explanation at this point is that it informs the jury how to
deal with the change in the order of the evidence and also alerts the
jurors to the fact that the evidence they will be hearing is likely to
be strongly contested.
After the Science for Judges IX Conference held at Brooklyn
Law School in April, 2007, Judge Jack Weinstein asked for
suggestions on “any special instructions that should be given jurors
in a case that turns on scientific evidence about how to handle the
evidence.”58 My own sense from studying juror efforts to use
55

Juror Questions During Trial, supra note 23.
David L. Rosenhan, Sara L. Eisner & Robert J. Robinson, Notetaking
Can Aid Juror Recall, 18 LAW & HUM . BEHAV . 53, 59 (1994); Irwin A.
Horowitz & Lynne ForsterLee, The Effects of Note-Taking and Trial Transcript
Access on Mock Jury Decisions in a Complex Civil Trial, 25 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV . 373, 382–89 (2001).
57
Lynne ForsterLee, Irwin Horowitz, Elizabeth Athaide-Victor, & Nicole
Brown, The Bottom Line: The Effect of Written Expert Witness Statements on
Juror Verdicts and Information Processing, 24 LAW & HUM. BEHAV . 259
(2000).
58
E-mail from Margaret Berger, Suzanne J. & Norman Miles Professor of
Law, Brooklyn Law School to Shari Seidman Diamond, Howard J. Trienens
56
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expert testimony appropriately is that the typical jury instruction
that a judge delivers at the end of the trial comes too late. A better
approach to focus and assist jurors would involve an earlier
intervention: an instruction just before an expert testifies noting
that the complexity of some expert testimony poses a special
challenge, and the jurors may find it useful to submit questions for
the expert at the end of the expert’s testimony.
Explicit judicial acknowledgement of the complexity of expert
testimony, coupled with an indication from the judge that juror
questions would be appropriate at the conclusion of the witness’s
testimony, would serve a dual purpose. First, it would signal to the
jurors that the witness will be delivering important and potentially
difficult information. Second, it would convey the message that it is
acceptable for a juror to ask what might appear to be a “dumb”
question. Although there is no reason to permit jurors to submit
questions only for expert witnesses, this special instruction on
submitting questions for experts could occur whether or not juror
questions are permitted for other witnesses. 59
The easiest path for judges to take in conducting jury trials is to
avoid any unnecessary communication with the jury during the
trial, to follow traditional orders and procedures, and to depend
solely on the efforts of the parties to enable the jurors to
understand the evidence. Adopting this passive judicial model
avoids criticism; moreover, attorneys may prefer judges to stay in
the background as much as possible during trial. It does make some
sense to be cautious because jurors are aware of the alignment of
witnesses and attorneys, and, viewing the judge as a more
trustworthy source of information, jurors may look for cues from
the judge.60 As one of the Arizona Jury Study deliberations made
Professor of Law and Professor of Psychology, Northwestern University School
of Law (April 27, 2007, 11:49 EST) (on file with author) (Judge Weinstein’s
question was conveyed by Professor Berger in an E-mail to Shari Seidman
Diamond and Valerie Hans).
59
Warren D. Wolfson, An Experiment in Juror Interrogation of Witnesses,
12 CHI . B. ASS’ N REC. 1, 12, 13 (1987).
60
Peter David Blanck & LaDoris Hazzard Cordell, The Appearance of
Justice: Judges’ Verbal and Nonverbal Behavior in Criminal Jury Trials, 38
STAN . L. R EV . 89, 93 (1985).
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clear, the judge is never invisible:
Juror #1: I’ve got to say, the judge is really good at keeping
a poker face. (Several other jurors: Yeah) Because I mean
through all that testimony, through the little heated debates
that go on. The attorneys sure seemed to get upset a couple
of times or acted like they were.
Juror #4: You’ve got to have an opinion on something.
Juror #1: I know! I looked at him the whole time, and he
never. . .
Juror #6: [interrupting] So did I!
Juror #1: [continuing] Well, not the whole time, but he
never made a face. I never got the feeling that he thought
one thing or another. And that’s a skill.
Juror #5: Yeah.
None of the procedures suggested here, many of them currently
used in the Arizona Jury Study courtroom that produced this juror
exchange, alter the impartial position of the judge in this example.
All are neutral ways to reduce unnecessary juror confusion. The
judge who uses these methods thus can serve all of the trial
participantsparties, jurors, and expertswithout favoring, or
appearing to favor, any one of them.

